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EXHIBIT A 
MOTION FOR APPORTIONMENT OF 
FAULT OF SALT LAKE CITY (R 100 - 101) 
ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* 
* MOTION FOR APPORTIONMENT OP 
* FAULT OF SALT LAKE CITY 
* Civil No. C91-1901 
* Judge Frederick 
Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, moves 
the court for its order determining that the verdict form at 
trial in this case will include an apportionment of fault to Salt 
Lake City Corporation. 
As a basis for this motion, defendant shows the court 
that discovery has demonstrated that Salt Lake City Corporation 
was partially or completely at fault in causing the accident 
which is the subject of this action. This motion is supported by 
the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities. 
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMY NELSON, 
Defendant. 
-A^-^ 1992. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
*T L^/STEV^ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
foregoin 
this 
record: 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
nstrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on 
day of />*^7, , 1992, to the following counsel of 
Ford G. Scalley 
John E. Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jfa^/foafi& '/totm?,*-^ 
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EXHIBIT B 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION ON JURY VERDICT 
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT (R 112 - 118) 
ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMY NELSON, 
Defendant. 
* 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IM SUPPORT OF 
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION OM JURY VERDICT 
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT 
Civil No. C91-1901 
Judge Frederick 
FACTS 
1. This action arises out of an automobile accident 
that occurred on July 6, 1989 at the intersection of 3rd Avenue 
and Canyon Road in Salt Lake City. The accident resulted when 
defendant did not stop at a stop sign and entered the 
intersection and collided with plaintiff. 
2. There is evidence in this case that the stop sign 
was bent prior to the accident and was obscured by tree limbs. 
The limbs were cleared a day or two later. 
0112 
3. Defendant will present evidence and expert opinion 
to the effect that because of the obstructed stop sign, defendant 
was not aware and would not reasonably have been aware that she 
needed to stop and, therefore, fault lies with Salt Lake City for 
failing to maintain the stop sign. 
4. Plaintiff's Complaint was not filed until March 21, 
1991, more than a year and a half after the accident. 
Consequently, plaintiff's action against the City was time barred 
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by the time the Complaint 
was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER UTAH COMPETITIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW, IT 18 APPROPRIATE TO 
CONSIDER THE FAULT OF ALL RESPONSIBLE PARTIES SO THAT 
LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT NELSON IS RESTRICTED 
TO HER OWN DEGREE OF FAULT. 
Prior to the passage of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, 
Utah law provides for joint and several liability of joint tort-
feasors. This created numerous inequitable situations where a 
party who bore a limited degree of fault was compelled to pay for 
the fault of the other joint tort-feasor as well as his own. The 
Reform Act of 1986 was passed to remedy this inequity. 
The Act specifically provides that a negligent party 
shall only pay for his own proportion of fault. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall 
not alone bar recovery by that person. He 
may recover from any defendant or group of 
2 
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defendants whose fault exceeds his own. 
However, no defendant is liable to anv person 
seeking recovery for anv amount in excess of 
the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant-
S 78-27-38, Utah Code Ann. (Emphasis added). 
The Tort Reform Act went on to eliminate any right of 
contribution between joint tort-feasors. Section 78-27-40# Utah 
Code Annotated, provides: 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable to 
any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant. No 
defendant is entitled to contribution from 
any other person. (Emphasis added.) 
The statutory scheme requires that all of the joint 
tort-feasors who are potentially at fault be included on the 
verdict form. Without that inclusion, a result totally contrary 
to the statutory scheme is possible. 
For example, in the instant case, a jury could conclude 
that plaintiff was without fault. They could also conclude that 
the stop sign was obscured but that defendant Nelson still should 
have been traveling at a lower speed or in some other manner had 
a small degree of fault of 5 to 10 percent. Under the standard 
verdict form, a jury is forced to treat all of the fault 
presented to them as 100 percent. If they consider plaintiff's 
3 
fault to be zero and if no other persons were on the verdict 
form, they would be forced to conclude that defendant Nelson was 
100 percent at fault. Defendant Nelson would end up paying for 
100 percent of plaintiff's judgment when, in fact, she was only 
responsible for 5 to 10 percent of the judgment. She would then 
have no right to sue for contribution. 
Other responsible persons must be included on the 
verdict form. Otherwise, defendant Nelson could pay more than 
her share in violation of the statute and its purpose. 
Plaintiff will doubtless point to Section 78-27-41 
regarding joinder of defendants and claim that the city should 
have been joined earlier. The fact is, however, that the statute 
says such parties may be joined as defendants. It is not 
mandatory. The overall statutory scheme is not conditioned on 
whether such defendants are joined. In fact, the statute defines 
"defendant" as any person not immune from suit who is claimed to 
be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 78-
27-37(1), Utah Code Annotated. The definition does not require 
that the "defendant" actually be a party to the suit. 
It is readily apparent that there is no unfair hardship 
or prejudice to the plaintiff by including Salt Lake City on the 
verdict form. Defendant Nelson's initial Answer in this matter 
raised the defense of the negligence of third parties. Her 
4 
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Answers to Interrogatories dated May 23, 1991 included a response 
to Interrogatory No. 22 identifying the fact that the stop sign 
was bent and partially obscured by foliage. She repeated this 
information at her deposition on July 2, 1991. 
Plaintiff has been well aware of the problem with the 
stop sign for over nine months. She has known that this is an 
issue relied on by defendant to contest liability. She cannot 
claim unfair surprise. 
Whether the City is joined as a defendant in the case 
or simply included on the verdict form makes no difference to 
plaintiff. Because of the time bar of the Governmental Immunity 
Act at Section 63-30-13, plaintiff has no direct claim against 
the City and it could not be a direct defendant. 
Whether the City was joined as an additional defendant 
under Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated or not has had no 
effect on plaintiff and has not prejudiced her in any way. The 
City must be included on the verdict form in order to effectuate 
the policy of the Tort Reform Act. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, it appears that the joint tort-feasor 
with primary liability has not been joined as a defendant. 
Nevertheless, the parties have been aware of the existence of the 
claim of Salt Lake City's fault for over nine months. Including 
5 
0111 
Salt Lake City on the verdict form will not prejudice or 
jeopardize plaintiff or deny her any rights. On the other hand, 
if Salt Lake City is left off the jury form, defendant Nelson 
will be denied the benefit to which she is entitled under the 
Utah Tort Reform Act. The jury would be forced to apportion 100 
percent of fault without having all of the tort-feasors before 
it, and the purpose and scheme of the Tort Reform Act will be 
frustrated. 
Defendant's motion to include Salt Lake City on the 
verdict form should be granted. Alternatively, Salt Lake City 
should be listed as a defendant and included on the verdict form. 
DATED this day of -r~^/*>^4~~, , 1992. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
IT L. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
6 
CgRTIFICATB QF ggRVICB 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was HAND DELIVERED on this 26th day of 
February, 1992, to the following counsel of record: 
Ford G. Sealley 
John E. Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
0 
7 
Ollf 
EXHIBIT C 
NOTICE OF HEARING (R 119 - 120) 
ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMY NELSON, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. C91-1901 
Judge Frederick 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant's Motion in Limine 
and Motion for Apportionment of Fault of Salt Lake City will come 
on for hearing on Tuesday, March 3, 1992 at the hour of 9:15 a.m. 
before The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the Third 
District Court. 
DATED this l^-A day of \^e6sis«~, 1992. 
RICHARDS , BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
ROBERT L. 'STEVENS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE 07 SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct £opy of the 
foregoing instrximent was hand delivered on this p&- day of 
fr>b , 1992, to the following counsel of record: 
Ford G. Sealley 
John E. Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<M ?• Ilukhmi^y 
2 
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EXHIBIT D 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO 
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION ON JURY VERDICT 
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT (R 135 - 138) 
FORD G. SCALLEY, #2869 
JOHN E. HANSEN, #4590 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
AMY NELSON, : 
Defendant. : 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO 
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY 
CORPORATION ON JURY VERDICT 
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT 
: Civil No. C91-1901 
: Judge Frederick 
ARGUMENT 
THE ONLY APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTE 
MANDATES THAT AN ENTITY BE JOINED 
AS A PARTY DEFENDANT BEFORE IT CAN 
BE ADDED TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM. 
The relevant statute which must be interpreted is Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-41 (1987), entitled -Joinder of defendants," 
and reads as follows: 
A person seeking recovery, or any 
defendant who is a party to the 
litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage 
for which recovery is sought, for 
the purpose of having determined 
their respective proportions of 
fault. 
(Emphasis added.)1 
Section 78-27-41 gave Defendant the ability to add Salt 
Lake City Corp. ("Salt Lake CityH) to this lawsuit, but Defendant 
has chosen not to do so in a timely manner. If Defendant desired 
to add Salt Lake City to this lawsuit for the purposes of having 
their respective portion of fault determined, S 78-27-41 provides 
the necessary mechanism. Defendant was not deprived of the 
ability to have Salt Lake City added to the Special Verdict Form, 
but clearly was required to add it as a party defendant to the 
lawsuit before this Court is authorized to add Salt Lake City to 
the Special Verdict Form for the purpose of having its respective 
portion of fault determined. 
Defendant was served with the Complaint in this case on 
March 21, 1991, almost a year ago. In December 1991, the Court 
set a trial date for March 4-6, 1992. The deadline for the 
completion of discovery was February 20, 1992. Now on February 
26, 1992, less than one week before trial, Defendant has filed a 
motion to add Salt Lake City to the Special Verdict Form. The 
problem with adding Salt Lake City to the Special Verdict Form in 
this case is created by Defendant's pre-designed strategy or lack 
1
 This statute was enacted in 1986, repealing the former 
statute making pre-1986 case law inapplicable. 
2 
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of diligence. To allow Defendant to sit on her right created by 
§ 78-27-41 and then at this late date attempt to slip these non-
parties onto the Special Verdict Form would create horribly 
inequitable results. Defendant would be placed in the position 
of making allegations against an entity who is not a defendant 
and not properly defended in the lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory scheme contemplates only listing 
"defendants" and the plaintiff on the Special Verdict Form for 
the purposes of apportioning fault. It provides a mechanism to 
allow a defendant to add an additional party as a "defendant" for 
the apportionment of fault. Defendant chose for tactical reasons 
not to follow this procedure, instead attempting to add 
undefended parties to the Special Verdict Form. 
The Court should not allow Defendant to ignore the 
statutory scheme and mechanism for adding parties to the Special 
Verdict Form. This would seriously and inappropriately prejudice 
Plaintiff Julie Turner. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of March, 1992. 
SCALLEy? & READING 
/
Jamil E. Hansen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
0137 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Inclusion of Salt Lake City Corporation on Jury 
Verdict for Apportionment of Fault to be hand delivered to the 
following parties and counsel of record on this 3rd day of March, 
1992: 
Robert L. Stevens, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
4 
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EXHIBIT E 
MINUTE ENTRY (R 139) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TURNER, JULIE ANDERSON 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
NELSON, AMY 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910901901 PI 
DATE 03/03/92 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER ANNA BENNETT 
COURT CLERK CLB 
TYPE OF HEARING: MOTION HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. HANSEN, JOHN E. 
D. ATTY. STEVENS, ROBERT L. 
PRIOR TO TRIAL, THIS CASE COMES NOW ON BEFORE THE COURT FOR 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE, ALL PARTIES PRESENT 
AND BEING REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AS SHOWN ABOVE. THE VARIOUS 
MOTIONS ARE ARGUED TO THE COURT BY RESPECTIVE COUNSEL AND 
SUBMITTED. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING FULLY 
ADVISED IN THE PREMISES, RULES AS STATED ON THE RECORD. 
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EXHIBIT F 
MOTION TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO 
CALL A NEWLY DISCOVERED 
WITNESS, JIM MAKLING, AS A 
WITNESS AT TRIAL (R 143 - 160) 
Third Judicial District 
Ford G. Scalley, #2869 
John E. Hansen, #4590 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
MAR 5 1992 
»-&• 
klLAI 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMY NELSON, 
Defendant* 
MOTION TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO 
CALL A NEWLY DISCOVERED 
WITNESS, JIM MARLING, AS A 
WITNESS AT TRIAL 
Civil No. C91-1901 
Judge Frederick 
As set forth in the affidavit of counsel attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A, " upon the completion of the 
first day of trial, and in response to the Court's granting, on the 
morning of trial, defendant's motion for apportionment of fault of 
Salt Lake City, and based upon defendant's very obvious strategy to 
contend that most, if not all, of the blame for this accident must 
be placed with Salt Lake City due to the allegedly obstructed stop 
sign, plaintiff's counsel has sought out and was successful in 
locating a resident in the immediate vicinity of the subject stop 
sign, Jim Makling, who has testimony directly relevant to the lack 
C:\JEH\PLEADINO\TURNBR.MTA 
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of obstruction of the stop sign. Accordingly, plaintiff is filing 
this motion prior to commencing the second day of trial, in order 
to request that plaintiff be allowed to call Mr. Makling in her 
case-in-chief, or at the very least, plaintiff submits that she 
should be allowed to call Mr. Makling as a rebuttal witness should 
the defense call any witnesses who claim that the stop sign is 
obstructed. 
Realizing that defendant's counsel has not had an 
opportunity to interview or depose this newly discovered witness, 
and in an effort to give the defendant fair and reasonable 
opportunity to evaluate witness Maklingfs testimony, plaintiff 
would agree to allow defendant to interview or take the deposition 
of this witness during a break in the proceeding if defendant would 
so desire. Plaintiff would then call witness Makling as a rebuttal 
witness after defendant presents her case. 
This motion is based upon the accompanying affidavit of 
counsel as well as the case authority cited in 63 ALR 4th 712, 
surprise witnesses—nonexperts. Section 10 of 63 ALR 4th 712, 
found at page 786 and 787 citing cases wherein several courts in 
other jurisdictions had held that it was proper to allow or 
improper to exclude the testimony of an undisclosed witness where 
the calling party's need for the witness' testimony had not 
C:\JEH\PLEADIHG\TURNER.MTA 2 
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previously been apparent, is attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference as Exhibit "B." 
In conclusion, plaintiff submits that in the interest of 
justice, and in order to allow plaintiff to properly respond to the 
clearly directed attack in the unrepresented entity Salt Lake City, 
plaintiff respectfully submits that she should be allowed to call 
this most critical, newly discovered witness, Jim Makling, at 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th of March, 1992. 
SCALLEY.& READING 
<^*%i^Si 
E. Hansen 
torney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICA^g OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of March, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was hand delivered to 
the following: 
Robert L. Stevens, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh,Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
C:\JEH\PLEADIHG\TURNER.MTA 
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Ford G. Scalley, #2869 
John E. Hansen, #4590 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER, : AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
AMY NELSON, : Civil No. C91-1901 
Defendant. : Judge Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, John E. Hansen, being first duly sworn, depose and say 
as follows: 
1. I am counsel of record for plaintiff, Julie Turner, 
in the above-referenced matter. 
2. On February 26, 1992, less than one week before the 
commencing of this trial, defendant filed a motion for 
apportionment of fault of Salt Lake City. 
C:\JEH\PLEADINC\TURNER.AFr 
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3. Prior to defendant's filing of the motion to 
apportion fault of Salt Lake City, plaintiff had filed her 
designation of witnesses and exhibits. 
4. On March 3, 1992, immediately prior to the 
commencement of the above-captioned trial, the Court granted 
defendant's motion to apportion fault of Salt Lake City. 
5. Thereafter, defendant's counsel argued to the jury 
in opening statement that the party most responsible for causing 
this accident is Salt Lake City due to an obstruction of the stop 
sign by trees. 
6. Because of the Court's ruling allowing Salt Lake 
City to be added to the special verdict on the first day of trial 
and based upon the strong and primary attack which the defendant is 
presenting against Salt Lake City, affiant has sought to find and 
has now located a previously unknown and unidentified witness 
critical to the presentation of plaintiff's case. 
7. Upon the conclusion of the first day of trial, at 
6:20 p.m. on March 3, 1992, affiant was able to contact said new 
witness, Jim Makling, for the first time. 
8. Mr. Makling resides at 122 North Canyon Road in Salt 
Lake City and is willing and able to testify at trial. 
C:\JEH\PLEADING\TURNER.APF 2 
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9. Mr. Makling has resided at 122 North Canyon Road, in 
the immediate vicinity of the stop sign at issue in this lawsuit, 
for the past ten years. 
10. Mr. Makling will testify that the stop sign has not 
been obstructed by trees or foliage during the past ten years and 
was not obstructed by trees or other foliage at the time of this 
accident. 
11. Furthermore, Mr. Makling will testify that there has 
never been a need for and there has never been a trimming of the 
trees to eliminate obstruction of the subject stop sign. 
12. Accordingly, affiant submits that Mr. Makling is a 
material and critical witness for the plaintiff in the above-
referenced matter. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 4th day of[Maroh( 1992. 
E. Hansen 
On this 4th day Iy6t March, 1992, before me, the 
undersigned notary, personally appeared John E. Hansen, who is 
personally known to me to be the person who signed the preceding 
document in my presence and who affirmed to me that the signature 
is voluntary and the document truthful. 
Notary Public ' 
C:\JEH\PLEADING\TURNER.AFF 
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§ 10. Lack of apparent need for 
witness 
In the* following cases, the courts 
held or %tated that it was proper to 
allow or improper to exclude the 
testimony ol an undisclosed wit-
ness, where the calling party's need 
for the witness' testimony had not 
previously been apparent 
In Darwin v Metropolitan Atlanta 
Rapid transit Authority (1981) 158 
Ga App 635, 281 Sr.2d 361. the 
c 4»uit. discussing the admissibility 
ol the- ic-stunom ol a witness who 
had not been disc losed in a pretrial 
cndei. slated that it would never 
<mi.nl a parts * light to produce in 
its behall witnesses whose necessity 
or perhaps existence was only 
lately readied 
rinding that the trial court in a 
wronglul death action had not 
abused its discretion in allowing 
the defense to call an undisclosed 
witness, the court in Curry v Sum-
mer (1985, 4th Dm) 136 111 App 
3d 468. 91 III Dec 365. 483 Nh2d 
711 (disagreed with on other 
grounds Chambers v Rush-Presby-
tertan St Luke's Medical Center 
(1st Dist) 133 III App 3d 458. 508 
NE2d 426). noted that a defendant 
had contended that the witness* 
testimony became necessary due to 
the plaintiff* s strategy in cross-ex-
amining other defense witnesses 
Staling that it did not approve ol 
the complete lack of notice, the 
court nevertheless afhimcd judg-
ment on a jury verdict in favor of 
the defendants. 
In Huhn v Marshall Exploration. 
Inc. (1976. La App 2d O r ) 337 So 
2d 561. 55 OCR 454. cert den ( U ) 
339 So 2d 854. an action seeking 
cancellation of an oil and gas lease, 
the court found no abuse of discre-
tion in the trial court's having al-
lowed the testimony of dn undis-
closed defense witness, where the 
witness was < ailed because the tes-
timony of other defense witnesses 
had been excluded on hearsay 
grounds Itie excluded testimony 
concerned vandalism which caused 
the defendant not to be able to 
market gas during a 4-month pe-
riod, while the unlisted witness. Af\ 
employee of the defendant, was in 
the field and periodicallv observed 
the effect of the vandalism 
I he couit in Nuhol v hi l\ir 
Motoi Sales (1973) 4r> Mich App 
426. 206 NVVid I'M), holding ihat 
the trial |udge in an action arising 
from an automobile accident was 
justified in allowing the testimony 
of a witness for the plaintiff, ex-
plained that the plaintiff had been 
unable to obtain records from the 
owner of the automobile, his em-
ployer, which would establish that 
one of the automobiles involved in 
the accident had been sold by the 
defendant manufacturer to the de-
fendant dealer, and that the wit-
ness had been able to identify the 
vehicle based on an accident report 
whu h he had prepared while acting 
as an insurance adjuster I "he wit-
ness' name had not been listed in 
the pretrial summary, nor was it 
submitted to opposing counsel 
within the 45-day period allowed 
under the pretrial order for 
amending the witness list 
Rejecting the contention that the 
tnal court in an action for breach 
of an emptovtnent contract should 
have granted a new trial because of 
the plaintiffs failure to comply 
fully with discovery requests calling 
for the identification of witnesses, 
the couit in rarret! v Auto Club of 
Michigan (1986) 155 Mich App 
378. 399 NW2d 531. I BNA ILR 
Cas 1437. held that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in 
accepting as true the plaintiff's ex-
planation that he had not identified 
a witness during discovery because 
he had not expected to rely on the 
witness* testimony until shortly be-
fore trial I lie court also noted 
that the plaintiff disclosed the wit-
ness 10 d.i\< belore trial and 
agreed to allow an interview of the 
witness prior to the commence-
ment ol the trial 
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whether it was poor, rich or nondescript; 
and incidentally, there is no such thing as 
"jail clothes" in the sense of being in a 
uniform or having distinctive markings so 
indicating.3 In any event, that sole fact 
would have revealed nothing new to the 
jury, certainly nothing concerning his guilt 
or innocence. They could not have failed to 
be aware that a man charged with armed 
robbery was in custody and being held in 
jail. Indeed, that fact was brought out in 
the evidence. Moreover, there is no basis 
other than the merest conjecture as to 
whether whatever type of clothing the peti-
tioner was wearing would inspire sympathy 
for, or prejudice against, the petitioner, or 
would have any effect on the jury's deter-
mination of his guilt or innocence. 
In the interest of giving effect to legal 
procedures and the solidarity of judgments 
once fairly arrived at, it is our settled law 
that in order to justify reversing a convic-
tion, it is essential that it be made to appear 
both that an error was committed and that 
it was prejudicial in that there is a reasona-
ble likelihood that it affected the outcome 
of the trial.4 
In summary, there are several proposi-
tions, each of which should prevent the 
reversal of the judgment: 
First, the absence of any credible basis in 
the evidence to show that the petitioner 
wore so-called jail clothing, or that there 
was any prejudice which resulted there-
from. 
Second, failure to can attention to the 
matter either at the time of the original 
trial, or at the time of sentence, or on 
appeal. 
Third, there are the presumptions of reg-
ularity and verity of the original trial and 
the judgment which has not been accorded. 
Fourth, the same statement applies as to 
this proceeding and the affirmative duty to 
show prejudicial error. 
Fifth, all of those, together with the too-
long delayed complaint about matters 
3. This case is similar to State v Archuletta. 28 
Ut.ih 2d 255. 501 P 2d 263 (1972) 
which should long since have been at rest, 
combine, in my mind, to make a convincing 
case for supporting the judgment of the 
trial court. 
This petitioner has had not only all of the 
protections the law allows, including the 
jury trial, assisted by competent counsel, 
but he was also given a full and fair oppor-
tunity in this habeas corpus proceeding to 
present any evidence to persuade a differ-
ent, fair and conscientious district judge 
that he has suffered an injustice. Having 
failed in both of those trials, the majority 
opinion directs that this proceeding be fur-
ther proliferated. That is the prerogative 
of this Court to which I owe such deference 
as is appropriate. But it is equally my 
prerogative and responsibility to express 
my disagreement therewith and my judg-
ment that there should be no such further 
proceedings. I would affirm and approve 
the judgments already entered herein. 
HALL, J., concurs 
CROCKETT, C. J. 
in the opinion of 
The BOARD OF EDUCATION of SOUTH 
SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT. Plain-
tiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Donald K. BARTON and Utah Farm 
Production Credit Assn., Defendants 
and Appellant 
No. 15946. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 28, 1980. 
Landowner appealed from judgment 
entered by the District Court, Sanpete 
4. This is the express mandate of Section 77 
42 1. UC A 1953 See e g . State v Neai. 1 
Utah 2d 122. 161 P 2d 756 (1953) 0150 
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County, Don V. Tibbs, J.t on jury verdict in 
eminent domain proceeding. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) fact that 
complaint had stated that the value of land 
was higher than amount awarded by the 
jury did not show that the damages were 
insufficient where the complaint referred to 
the value of land and water rights and the 
judgment referred only to the land, but (2) 
landowner should ho™ K~»n p o r n ^ y H tn 
elicit, from expert witness whom he wished 
tO Call, fact that the expert HaH nriflnnally 
been hired by the condemning authority to 
make an appraisal of the property. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Crockett, C. J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion. 
1. Eminent Domain <*=»241 
Where school district's complaint in 
eminent domain proceeding stated that val-
ue of the property was $48,980 but that 
figure included both land and water rights 
and trial court correctly ruled that water 
rights were not to be taken, the allegation 
in the complaint did not preclude an award 
of only $40,000 for the tract 
2. Eminent Domain <*» 191(1) 
Landowner was entitled to the value of 
his land as fixed by the jury, based upon 
the evidence, and not necessarily the 
amount stated in the pleadings of either 
party in the eminent domain proceeding. 
3. Evidence <*=> 142(1) 
In eminent domain proceeding involv-
ing 24.49 acres, trial court properly exclud-
ed, as not being a-cemparable sale, evidence 
of the sale of an acre of land to a church for 
$10,000 where the testimony indicated that 
transaction actually involved more than one 
acre and that the seller was to give the 
church some adjoining property as part of 
the deal. 
4. TriaJ **$2(1) 
"Rphn^l PvirUnce" is that which tends 
to refuteTor to so modify or explain as to 
nullify or minimize the effect of, the oppo-
nent's evidence.. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Pretrial Procedure *»753 
Where defense witness gave testimony 
about an allegedly comparable sale which 
could have been regarded a* requiring ex-
planation it was proper and consistent with 
pretrial order limiting the parties to the 
witnesses nawwrf therein except for rebuttal 
witnesses to allow testimony from another 
witness concerning that transaction. 
6. Evidence «»543<3) 
Landowner should have been permitted 
to call, as witness to give opinion as to the 
value of the land, a person who had origi-
nally been hired by the condemning author-
ity to appraise the land and to elicit testi-
mony to the effect that he had been em-
ployed by the condemning authority for 
that purpose. 
7. Witnesses *=>319, 330(1), 331% 
Attack on credibility of a party's wit-
ness may be conducted by the other party 
either by his own cross-examination of the 
witness or by calling other witnesses to 
accomplish that purpose. 
8. Evidence *»560 
Where testimony of one expert whom 
landowner wished to call would have set the 
value of the property below that testified to 
by his other experts, trial court ruling that 
he could not elicit from the witness the fact 
that the witness had originally been hired 
by the condemning authority to make an 
appraisal of the land effectively precluded 
the defendant from calling that witness, as 
his testimony without the explanation 
would have been harmful. 
Paul R. Frischkneckt, Manti, for Farm 
Production Credit Ass'n. 
Arthur H. Neilsen and Clark R. Nielsen 
Of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & Peck, 
Salt Lake City, for Barton. 
Bruce Findlay and Dan S. Bushnell of 
Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
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STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant Donald K. Barton appeals, 
complaining of the inadequacy of a jury 
award of $40,000 for his 24.49 acre tract of 
land in Manti taken by eminent domain by 
the plaintiff. 
[1,2] The defendant's first argument in 
support of his contention that insufficient 
damages were awarded for his property is 
that the plaintiffs complaint itself had 
stated the value to be $48,980. The rejoin-
der to this is that that figure included both 
the land and water rights. The trial court 
correctly ruled that the water rights were 
not to be taken. Plaintiffs appraiser testi-
fied that the defendant's property would be 
worth substantially loss without the water 
rights. Accordingly, the $40,000 awarded 
could reasonably be found to be supported 
by the expert testimony as to the value of 
the land. Nevertheless, what the defend-
ant was entitled to was the value of his 
land as fixed by the jury, based upon the 
evidence, and not necessarily as stated in 
the pleadings of either party. 
[3] Defendant further urges that the 
trial court committed error which influ-
enced the jury in not awarding greater 
damages in its rulings concerning testimony 
about the sale of an acre of land in Manti to 
the L.D.S. ("Mormon") Church for $10,000 
by one Grant Cox. The trial court's state-
ment that it was not a comparable sale is 
apparently correct The testimony of the 
defendant's appraiser, Marcellus Palmer, 
and the plaintiffs witness, Wilbur Cox, in-
dicated that the transaction involved more 
than one acre and that Grant Cox was to 
give the church some adjoining property as 
part of the deal. 
[4,5] Defendant also complains about 
permitting Wilbur Cox to be called as a 
witness concerning this transaction. He as-
serts that it had been agreed, and the court 
included in its pre-trial order, that the only 
witnesses to be called were those named 
therein, except for rebuttal. Rebuttal evi-
dence is that which tends to reTutq, or to so 
modify or explainf as to nullify or minimize 
the effect of the opponent's evidence. See 
Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11,395 P.2d 
25 (1964). Since the testimony Mr. Palmer 
had given about th* <?M t r » w w t i n n ™"lH 
have been regarded as requiring explana-
tion, it was qijite proper *n<\ consistent with 
the just-stated definition to consider Wilbur 
Cox's testimony as rebuttal. See Jenson v. 
S.H. Kiw&Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 ?2A 958 
(1935). It is also pertinent to note that the 
defendant cross-examined Wilbur Cox 
about the matter without showing any sig-
nificant difference from the other evidence. 
We are unable to perceive how the trial 
court's rulings, or what was said with re-
spect to the Cox sale, resulted in any preju-
dice to the defendant 
Defendant also assigns error in the trial 
court's ruling concerning Dee Ogden, who 
had made an appraisal at the instance of 
the plaintiff. Pursuant to a discussion of 
this matter in the absence of the jury, 
plaintiff requested the court to rule that 
the defendant could not elicit before the 
jury the fact that Ogden had been em-
ployed by the plaintiff Board of Education. 
The plaintiffs motion was 
[t]o prevent Mr. Ogden from, in any way, 
testifying or the defendant landowner 
from asking the witness that his apprais-
al was made for the School Board, or that 
Mr. Ogden was paid a fee . . . . 
The trial court explained its ruling as fol-
lows: 
The motion is granted and it looks to me 
like it would not be proper and I think I 
would be committing prejudicial error to 
allow, this to go in. You can call him for 
an appraisal but not to give testimony 
that he was employed by the School Dis-
trict or make any reference to the School 
District's paying him so you may get his 
appraisal, but that's the limit of it, Mr. 
Ogden. 
[6] The trial court erred in ruling that 
the defendant could call Ogden to give his 
appraisal of the condemned land but could 
not be questioned as to the fact that he was 
employed by the school district That testi-
mony went to the heart of the issue at trial. 
Defendant's purpose was to elicit testimo-
ny concerning the value of the property, 0152 
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which it may be assumed was greater than 
what plaintiff's witnesses had testified to. 
It was, of course, directly probative of the 
central issue in the case. But equally im-
portant, defendant had strong reason and a 
legal right to ask Ogden the identity of his 
employer. That testimony, with the likeli-
hood of greater objectivity, would have 
served to rebut the valuation testimony of 
plaintiffs expert witnesses. To deny the 
defendant that nght is to deny him a fair 
trial. The jury was entitled to know the 
essential background facts of the witness so 
as to be able to give proper weight to his 
testimony. 
The term "expert testimony" connotes a 
degree of objectivity imposed by the disci-
pline and training of the expert But valu-
ation testimony as to property in a condem-
nation proceeding sometimes falls short of 
that objective, partly because of the numer-
ous subjective and variable values, and 
therefore may differ sharply from the testi-
mony of another expert witness. Experts' 
opinions, especiaify in the area of valuation 
of property, often vary so widely that one 
may wonder whether they are valuing the 
same parcel of land. 
The court in this case prevented inquiry 
as to the identity of the employer of an 
expert witness. The jury could not, there-
fore, evaluate the process by which plaintiff 
chose his exj>erts nor determine the appro-
priate weight to be afforded the testimony 
of the witnesses for the respective parties. 
The defendant had a right to bring to the 
jury's attention the fact that a witness had 
been initially enlisted by plaintiff and pur-
suant to that employment had acquired his 
knowledge and formed his opinion as to the 
property's value. The circumstances by 
which Ogden became aware of the facts 
needed to form his opinion provided the 
necessary foundation for the jury to weigh 
the valuation testimony. More important-
ly, his employment bore directly on the 
all-important issue of his objectivity or bias. 
This information was essential, especially in 
light of the highly disparate views of the 
same facts that may be arrived at by differ-
ent experts. See Myers, "Battle of the 
Experts": A New Approach to an Old 
Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 Neb.L. 
Rev. 539 (1965); McCoid. Opinion Evidence 
and Expert Witnesses, 2 U.C.LA.LRev. 356 
(1955); DeParcq, Law, Science and the Ex-
pert Witness, 24 TennJLRev. 166 (1956). 
Expert witnesses, like other witnesses, 
are influenced by unconscious, and some* 
times conscious, biases. The problem of the 
expert witness's bias has been commented 
on by Dean Wigmore: 
That bias itself is due, partly to the spe-
cial fee which has been paid or promised 
him, and partly to his prior consultation 
with the party and his selfcommittal to a 
particular view. His candid scientific 
opinion thus has had no fair opportunity 
of expression, or even of formation, 
swerved as he is by this partisan commit-
tal [2 Wigmore on Evidence § 563 
at 761 (Chadboum rev. 1979).] 
Defendant clearly was entitled to the tes-
timony which the prohibited questions 
would have elicited, simply because it may 
well have been less likely to be biased than 
any of the other experts called by the par-
ties. This is especially true in this case 
because the valuation of plaintiffs and de-
fendant's experts were poles apart. Og-
den's appraisal was made under the di-
rection of the party adverse to the party 
who sought to adduce Ogden's testimony 
and thus carried a mark of objectivity that 
may not have been commanded by the other 
experts. 
[7] The defendant did not propose to 
call Ogden simply to impeach him. The 
questions prohibited by the trial court could 
not possibly have resulted in impeaching 
the witness; indeed, they would have given 
weight and substance to his testimony. If 
the proffered testimony would have dis-
credited anyone's testimony, it would have 
been the testimony offered by plaintiffs 
witnesses. It is axiomatic that an attack on 
the credibility of a party's witnesses may be 
conducted by the other party either by his 
own cross-examination of the witnesses or 
by calling other witnesses to accomplish 
that purpose. Haver v. Central Railroad 
Co., 64 NJ.L. 312, 45 A. 593 (1900). More 
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importantly, the testimony, because of its 
direct relevance as to value, went well be-
yond impeachment evidence. 
[8] Before Ogden was permitted to tes-
tify, plaintiffs counsel interrupted by ap-
proaching the bench for a discussion and 
made the motion above referred to to pre-
vent the testimony of the witness. The 
court responded by an order which preclud-
ed defendant's obtaining the testimony re-
garding the witness's employment by the 
school district or any reference to the school 
district's paying him to make an appraisal. 
Having been denied the right to examine 
the witness properly and to adduce the evi-
dence of employment, the defendant cannot 
be faulted for not having called the witness 
to testify solely as to the amount of his 
appraisal. Such testimony, no doubt, would 
have been lower than the amounts testified 
to by defendant's other experts and there-
fore without the necessary information as 
to the witness's background, damaging to 
defendant's case. Accordingly, the defend-
ant was effectively precluded from calling 
Ogden under the restriction imposed. 
Because of that error which appears to us 
as substantial and prejudicial, it is neces-
sary that the judgment be reversed and the 
case remanded. No costs awarded. 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., 
concur. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I am in agreement with the main opinion, 
except as to the manner In which it deals 
with the trial court's handling of the matter 
relating to possible testimony of Mr. Dee 
Ogden. He appears to have made an ap-
praisal at the instance of the plaintiff, but 
was not called as a witness. Pursuant to a 
discussion of the matter in the absence of 
the jury, plaintiff requested the court to 
rule that defendant could not elicit that 
fact before the jury. As will be noted in 
the statement quoted in the main opinion, 
the court told defendant's counsel: 
1. See 31 A m . J u r 2 d , Expert and Opin ion Evi-
dence, $ 50, and authori t ies cited tn the main 
opinion 
You can call him for an appraisal, but not 
to give testimony that he was employed 
by the school district [Emphasis added.] 
In regard to the charge of error, I make 
several observations. The first is that I 
offer no defense of any notion that an 
expert cannot be asked who hired him. It 
is to be conceded that such a witness may 
be examined as to who employed him, and 
who is paying him, as having a possible 
bearing upon his motivation and his credi-
bility.1 Nor is it to be doubted that a trial 
court should be quite liberal in allowing any 
competent evidence offered by a party to 
prove his case. 
In regard to the evidence in question, it is 
my impression from the record that the 
trial court simply rejected the idea that Mr. 
Ogden could be called solely for the purpose 
of showing that he had been hired by the 
plaintiff School Board to make an appraisal 
and that the Board then failed to call him 
as its witness. It is significant to note that 
defendant's counsel did not pursue the mat-
ter and make plain to the trial court what 
he was proposing; and that he did not in 
any manner indicate what Mr. Ogden's tes-
timony would be.2 Therefore, any question 
as to the latter's credibility was never 
placed in issue; and more importantly, 
there is no basis upon which to determine 
whether the trial court's statement had any 
prejudicial effect upon the defendant's case 
I think the trial court was justified in its 
view that each side had a full and fair 
opportunity to present its evidence, includ-
ing that the experts for each side had suffi-
ciently presented their respective views as 
to value to the jury to enable it to make a 
fair determination on that issue. When 
that procedure has been accomplished, and 
the trial judge has also placed his stamp of 
approval upon the verdict by denying the 
motion for a new trial, this Court on review 
should indulge the verdict and the judg-
ment with the presumptions of verity; and 
2. That a proponent of evidence must make 
some such offer or indication of the substance 
of evidence, see Rule 5. Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 
352 Utah 617 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
should not disturb it unless it is shown that 
there is substantial error in whose absence 
there is a reasonable likelihood that there 
would have been a different result,5 
Upon the basis of the record, I am not 
persuaded that there was any such error or 
unfairness as to justify upsetting the ver-
dict and judgment. 
O I Kf THUMBS SYSTEM} 
Velma Gladys YATES, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER, a 
Project of the Division of Family and 
Community Medicine, University of 
Utah; Uintah County; Uintah County 
Hospital; Vernal Drug Company, a Utah 
corporation; Gordon Lee Balka, M. D., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 16602. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 29, 1980. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Fourth District Court, Unitah County, Al-
len B. Sorenson, J., dismissing medical mal-
practice complaint filed against health cen-
ter, county; county hospital, drug company, 
and physician. The Supreme Court, Wil-
kins,.J., held that: (1) trial court did not err 
in dismissing medical malpractice complaint 
against health center, drug company, and 
physician, in that plaintiff failed to serve 
proper notice of intent to commence action 
prior to* filing complaint; (2) plaintiff had 
one year to file another medical malpractice 
complaint against drug company, health 
center, and physician; and (3) trial court 
did not err in dismissing with prejudice 
medical malpractice complaint against 
X See Rule 61. U.R.C.P.; Ed^er w Willis. 17 
Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003 (1966). 
county and county hospital, in that plaintiff 
failed to serve proper notice of intent to 
commence action prior to filing complaint, 
and failed to give notice required by Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act and statute gov-
erning actions against county. 
Affirmed. 
1. Drugs and Narcotics <fc»20 
Hospitals <fc»8 
Physicians and Surgeons <s=»l&20 
Trial court did not err in dismissing 
medical malpractice complaint against 
health center, drug company, and physician, 
in that plaintiff failed to serve proper no-
tice of intent to commence action prior to 
filing complaint U.C.A.1953,78-14-8. 
2. Limitation of Actions «=* 130(1) 
Even though plaintiff failed to serve 
proper notice on health center, drug compa-
ny, and physician of intent to commence 
action prior to filing medical malpractice 
complaint, failure to serve notice did not 
constitute adjudication on merits; thus, 
plaintiff had one year from filing of opinion 
in which to file another complaint U.C.A. 
1953,78-12-40,78-14-8. 
3. Counties <s=»212 
Trial court did not err in dismissing 
with prejudice medical malpractice com-
plaint against county and county hospital, 
in that plaintiff failed to serve proper no-
tice of intent to commence action prior to 
filing complaint and failed to give notice 
required by Governmental Immunity Act 
and statute governing claims against coun-
ty. U.C.A.1953, 17-15-10, 63-30-13, 78-
14-8. 
4. Statutes <s=»85<l) 
Statute requiring notice to health care 
provider of intent to commence malpractice 
action was not unconstitutional special leg-
islation. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8. 
Robert M. McRae of McRae & DeLand, 
Vernal, for plaintiff and appellant 
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operations. However, this 
came much too late to save the depositors' 
money. 
Section 63-30-10(4) (1978) (amended 1982 
& 1985), which provides that immunity is 
not waived for injury that arises out of a 
failure to make an inspection or by reason 
of making an inadequate or negligent in-
spection of any property, presents no prob-
lem here. By the very language of subsec-
tion (4), it is inapplicable here since there is 
no complaint of negligent inspection of 
property. The cases which we have decid-
ed under subsection (4) confirm that it per-
tains to inspection of tangible property. In 
Velasquez v. Union Pacific R.R., 24 Utah 
2d 217, 218-19, 469 P.2d 5, 6 (1970), the 
plaintiff complained that the defendant, the 
Utah Public Service Commission, had not 
established a program to discover dilap-
idated railroad crossing signs and to re-
place them. In White v. State, 579 P.2d 
921, 923 (Utah 1978), the plaintiff, who was 
injured while working with machinery in a 
vegetable cannery, contended that the de-
fendant was aware, or should have been 
aware, of several violations of the safety 
regulations of the Utah Occupational 
Health and Safety Act by inspection. In 
the instant case, the plaintiff does not com-
plain of the Department's failure,to make 
an inspection of tangible property but of 
the Department's failure to examine and 
supervise West America Credit. I do not 
believe that the legislative intent in subsec-
tion (4) was to categorize financial exami-
nations and supervision as "inspections of 
property/' Therefore, subsection (4) does 
not confer any immunity upon'the Depart-
ment in this action. 
I would reverse the summary judgment 
granted the Department and remand the 
case to the trial court for a determination 
of the statutory duty of the Department in 
this case and the other issues. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of HOWE, Associate 
CJ. 
STATE v. ALBRETSEN 
Cite M 782 T2& SIS (Utah 1989) 
examination 
Utah 515 
( O |KfYMUM«RSYSUM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee. 
v. 
Douglas R. ALBRETSEN. Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880154. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 25, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond 
S. Uno, J., of aggravated burglary and 
theft, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, Associate CJ., held that* (1) 
probative value of mug shot* for purposes 
of corroborating identification of defendant 
outweighed any prejudice caused by sug-
gestion of prior criminal activity, and (2) 
trial court acted within its discretion in 
allowing testimony of rebuttal witness to 
impeach defendant's alibi evidence, even 
though prosecutor did not notify dpfondant 
prior to trial. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law e»438(3) 
Probative value of mug shots to cor-
roborate victim's identification of her at-
tacker outweighed any prejudice which 
might have been caused by mug shots cre-
ating suggestion of prior criminal activity. 
Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 404(b). 
« 
2. Criminal Law <S=>1168(2) 
Taping over, rather than cutting off, 
booking references at bottom of mug shots 
used to corroborate victim's identification 
of defendant, was not prejudicial error; de-
fendant was additionally identified by vic-
tim from six-picture photo display and in 
lineup. Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 404(b). 
3. Criminal Law <£»629.5(5) 
Trial court acted within its discretion 
in allowing rebuttal witness to testify, even 
though prosecuting attorney did not notify 
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defendant before trial that witness would 
testify to contradict and impeach defen-
dant's alibi evidence; evidentiary develop-
ment occurred in course of trial, prosecutor 
acted in flood faith and defgngft qfl»"«£l 
was told of possible rebuttal testimony as 
soon as need was discovered. U.C.A.1953, 
77-14-2(1, 4). 
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L Sjogren, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendant Douglas R. Albretsen appeals 
from convictions of aggravated burglary, a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978), and theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). 
On May 11, 1987, Maureen Leavitt re-
turned home from work at approximately 
5:30 to 5:45 p.m. After entering her house, 
she walked down the hall leading from the 
family room to the kitchen. As she ap-
proached the end of the hallway, a man 
with a club raised in his hand suddenly 
stepped in front of her; he was approxi-
mately two feet away. They looked at 
each other for approximately three seconds 
before he started beating her with the club, 
leaving her unconscious. She suffered ex-
tensive injuries and was hospitalized for 
two days. 
On' May 14, 1987, Leavitt identified de-
fendant as her attacker from a black loose-
leaf binder containing 30 to 50 mug shots 
given her by Detective Hutchison. Upon 
making this identification, she stated to her 
husband, "This looks like the man that beat 
me." The next day, Detective Hutchison 
showed Leavitt a display of six photos 
mounted on a piece of cardboard. She 
again selected the photograph of defen-
dant After defendant's arrest, Leavitt at-
tended a lineup where she again identified 
him as her assailant 
Several months prior to trial, defendant 
filed a notice of intent to rely on the de-
fense of alibi, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-14-2(1) (1982). He listed Brenda 
Davis and Cindy Edwards as alibi witness-
es. The State filed its reply to the notice, 
listing Detective Hutchison as a rebuttal 
witness. 
At the trial, the prosecutor moved for 
admission of the six-picture photo display, 
as well as the mug shots of defendant 
which he had removed from the black bind-
er and had altered by masking the booking 
references which appeared at the bottom. 
Defendant did not object to the admission 
of the photo display, and it was admitted. 
However, he did object to the mug shots on 
the ground that they were inherently preju-
dicial and because of the masking, which he 
argued would raise the jury's curiosity and 
suspicion. The court overruled the objec-
tion and admitted the mug shots to show 
one source of Leavitt's identification. On 
cross-examination, defendant's counsel had 
Leavitt repeat that when she identified de-
fendant from the loose-leaf binder, she told 
her husband: 'This looks like the man that 
beat me." Then, defense counsel ques-
tioned Leavitt about her identifications of 
the photographs. 
Several months prior to trial, Detective 
Hutchison obtained a handwritten state-
ment from Brenda Davis in which she 
claimed that defendant was with her at the 
time of the crime. Davis wrote that they 
had "gone up into the mountains for a ride, 
into Parley's Way and Emigration Can-
yon." At the trial, however, she testified 
in detail as to the route taken on the ride. 
After the defense rested, the prosecution 
informed the court that he anticipated 
some rebuttal and requested a recess in 
order to locate a Mr. Miller from the Utah 
Department of Transportation, who he be-
lieved would testify that the route claimed 
to have been taken by defendant and Bren-
da Davis was closed to traffic on May 11, 
1987. Defense counsel objected to the re-
cess and moved that evidence be closed at 
that time. The court denied the motion, 
and Mr. Miller was later allowed to testify 
over defendant's objection. 
I 
Defendant first contends that the trial 
court committed prejudicial error in admit-
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ting mug shots of him. He 
they suggested prior criminal activity, 
which suggestion was exacerbated by the 
masking of the booking reference. He re-
lies upon rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
Although this Court has never deter-
mined whether mug shots are admissible to 
corroborate identification testimony, rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
(Italics added.) However, even if evidence 
of prior wrongdoing is admissible under 
that rule, such evidence may be excluded 
under rule 403, which states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Thus, if the probative value of the evidence 
is not substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of prejudice, the scales are tipped in 
favor of admission. 
[1] In the instant case, the lower court 
correctly ruled that the mug shots were* 
admissible for purposes of establishing 
identity. Even though we Recognize that 
under rule 403, they could still be excluded, 
the mug shots here were crucial in estab-
lishing the identity of defendant, which 
was the main issue. They were the initial 
source of Leavitt's identification, and they 
explained her reaction when she identified 
him as her attacker. Also, admitting the 
mug shots served to rebut defendant's the-
ory that later identifications by her were 
connected to the mug shots rather than to 
the attacker. 
In a similar case, the testimony of a 
manager of a store that he recognized the 
STATE •. ALBRETSEN Utah 5 H 
QttM7S2 T2A 313 (Utah 1999) 
argues that defendant from police photographs or 
"mug shots" as the person for whom a 
money order had been cashed was held 
admissible on issue of identification. State 
v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123, 388 P.2d 797 
(Utah 1964). Similarly, in State v. Jiron, 
Zl Utah 2d 21, 22, 492 P.2d 983, 984 (Utah 
1972), this Court decided that "evidence of 
an extra-judicial identification is admissible, 
not only to corroborate an identification 
made at the trial [citation], but as indepen-
dent evidence of identity." (Quoting Peo-
ple v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 626, 354 P.2d 
865, 867, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 275 (I960).) 
During the trial, defendant argued that 
Leavitt had "difficulties with identifica-
tion" based on her statement, "This looks 
like the man that beat me." Thus, the mug 
shots were valuable in showing that while 
they were somewhat outdated, they never-
theless were identifiable likenesses of de-
fendant The jury was not equipped to 
decide whether Leavitt's identification was 
faulty without viewing the mug shots she 
used to identify him. The jury as the trier 
of fact had the duty of determining from 
the proof presented, which in this case in-
cluded the mug shots, whether Leavitt's 
identification was reliable. 
A Michigan court correctly observed in a 
similar case: 
[I]t would be better if the jury was not 
allowed to see mug shots of the defen-
dant However, where, as here, defense 
counsel has made an issue of the wit-
ness's ability to recognize the defendant 
from the picture he was shown by the 
police, it was not improper for the trial 
court to admit the photos. 
People v. Trainer, 39 Mich.App. 398, 402, 
197 N.W.2d 890, 892 (1972). 
[2] We next address whether the proce-
dures used by the trial court to minimize 
any possible prejudicial effect of the mug 
shots were proper and effective, i.e., taping 
over the booking references. Although the 
State had a demonstrable need to introduce 
the mug shots to establish identity, the 
trial court nevertheless erred in not cutting 
off the reference at the bottom. When 
suggestive material is masked, the curi-
osity of the jury is increased. Trial courts 
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should employ safeguards to disguise the 
origin of police photographs, including the 
removal of police identification numbers, 
United States v. Watts, 532 F.2d 1215, 
1217 (8th Cir.), cert denied 429 U.S. 847, 
97 S.Ct 131, 50 LEd.2d 119 (1976), and 
separating the combined profile and frontal 
views characteristic of mug shots. Id 
Since Leavitt additionally identified defen-
dant from the six-picture photo display as 
well as in a lineup, we do not find the error 
to have been prejudicial to defendant 
II 
[3] Defendant next assails the trial 
court's failure to sustain his objection to 
the admission of testimony by the State's 
rebuttal witness, Richard L. Miller, which 
admission defendant asserts violated Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-14-2 and denied him due 
process. That section provides: 
77-14-2. Alibi—Notice requirements— 
Witness lists. (1) A defendant, whether 
or not written demand has been made, 
who intends to offer evidence of an alibi 
shall, not less than ten days before trial 
or at such other time as the court may 
allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice, in writing, of his inten-
tion to claim alibi. The notice shall con-
tain specific information as to the place 
where the defendant claims to have been 
at the time of the alleged offense and, as 
particularly as is known to the defendant 
or his attorney, the names and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to 
establish alibi. The prosecuting attor-
ney, not more than five days after re-
ceipt of the list provided herein or at 
such other time as the court may direct, 
shall file and serve the defendant with 
the addresses, as particularly as are 
known to him, of the witnesses the state 
proposes to offer to contradict or im-
peach the defendant's alibi evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting at-
torney shall be under a continuing duty 
to disclose the names and addresses of 
additional witnesses which come to the 
attention of either party after filing their 
alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attor-
ney fails to comply with the require-
ments of this section, the court may ex-
clude evidence offered to establish or 
rebut alibi. However, the defendant 
may always testify on his own behalf 
concerning alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cau# 
shown, waive the requirements of this 
section. 
In her handwritten statement given the 
police, Brenda Davis stated that she and 
defendant had, on the day of the crane, 
"gone up into the mountains for a ride into 
Parley's Way and Emigration Canyon" 
However, when she testified at the trial, 
she described the exact route they too*, 
stating that they drove up Parley's Canyon 
(not Parley's Way, which is a different 
street), took the turnoff to East Canyon 
and followed that highway to the turnoff to 
Emigration Canyon and then came dovtn 
Emigration Canyon, which brought them 
back to Salt Lake City. Miller, an engineer 
for the Utah Department of Transporta-
tion, testified, over defendant's objection, 
that from April 13 to June 17, 1987, SRH», 
the highway which Davis claimed that they 
took linking Parley's Canyon and Emigra 
tion Canyon, was closed to traffic 
Defendant asserts that the trial court 
should not have allowed Mr. Miller to testi-
fy since the prosecuting attorney did not 
notify defendant prior to trial of its intent 
to have Miller testify to contradict anJ 
impeach defendant's alibi evidence, as re-
quired by section 77-14-2(1). We find no 
error in view of the fact that the Suit 
could not have reasonably anticipated the 
discrepancy between Davis's handwritten 
statement and her later testimony at tna! 
Inasmuch as there was a significani 
change in the route claimed to have beet 
taken, the trial court reasonably alio**: 
the prosecution to add to its rebuttal Ibt 
when this evidentiary development oc 
curred in the course of trial. The tnJ 
court acted within the discretion accords 
by section 77-14-2(4), which provides, "The 
court may, for good cause shown, waiw 
the requirements of this section." Tht 
prosecutor acted in good faith when hi 
apprised defense counsel of the possibii 
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STATE TAX CO! 
CSU«t7S2 T2& 
rebuttal testimony an floo* ?e 1>c ™»H wnc 
discovered. The Montana Supreme Court, 
in State v. Madera, 206 Mont 140, 670 P.2d 
552, 556 (1983), held that discretion should 
be given to "the District Court to permit 
additions to the witness list when good 
cause is shown; flood cause must certainly 
be construed to include the amendment of 
the.witness list because of evidentiary mat-
ters developed during the presentation of 
the case of either party, matters which 
require clarification or rebuttal by that par-
Defendant's convictions are affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Clay K. IVERSON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Nos. 20965, 860329. 
Supreme Court oi Utah. 
Nov. 2, 1989. 
On State Tax Commission's applica-
tions, the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., Issued writ of 
mandate compelling individual to file in-
come tax returns and adjudged individual 
in contempt of court for failing to comply 
with subpoena duces tecum issued by the 
Commission. Individual appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, CJ., held that (1) evi-
dence would not support granting of writ 
of mandate compelling filing of tax re-
turns; (2) individual's failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies with respect to no-
tice of deficiency precluded consideration 
H*N v. IVERSON Utah 519 
519 (Utah t*t») 
of individual's claims that he was not tax-
payer and that Commission's assessment 
and actions in regard thereto were invalid; 
and (3) excessive scope of subpoena did not 
provide individual good cause for failing to 
appear and provide information relating to 
availability of assets to satisfy tax assess-
ment, so individual was appropriately held 
in contempt 
Writ of mandate vacated; contempt ci-
tation affirmed. 
Stewart, J.t concurred in result. 
1. Taxation <*=»1083 
Evidence did not support granting of 
petition for writ of mandate to compel indi-
vidual to file income tax return; individual 
specifically denied that he received "in-
come" for the time in question and stated 
that to the best of his knowledge he had no 
filing requirement as to federal taxes, 
much of the exchange considered by court 
in making decision centered on unsworn 
statements regarding past conversations 
between the individual and counsel for 
State Tax Commission that the individual 
testified he could not recall, and there was 
no support for court's taking judicial notice 
that the individual's services could be 
equated to federal minimum wage levels. 
U.C.A.I953, 59-14A-71, 59-31-7 (now U.C. 
A.1953, 5S-10-525, 59-1-707). 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=>229 
Generally, parties must exhaust appli-
cable administrative remedies as prerequi-
site to seeking judicial review. 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=»229 
Exceptions to rule that parties must 
generally exhaust applicable administrative 
remedies as prerequisite to seeking judicial 
review exist in unusual circumstances in 
which it appears that there is likelihood 
that some oppression or injustice is occur-
ring so that it would be unconscionable not 
to review alleged grievance or when it ap-
pears that exhaustion would serve no use-
ful purpose. 
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EXHIBIT G 
SPECIAL VERDICT (R 288 - 291) 
Rl£D&&?&£Tfrtf&l 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 5 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMY NELSON, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
it 
* 
* 
* 
• 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C91-1901 
Judge Frederick 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes.11 If 
you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that 
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer 
"No." Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, 
Amy Nelson, was negligent as alleged by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
2. If you answered Question No. 1 as "yes", answer 
this question. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence 
of the defendant, Amy Nelson, was either the sole proximate cause 
or a contributing proximate case of the injuries of Julie Turner? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you answered either question No. 1 or Question No. 2 as "no", 
do not answer the remaining questions. 
3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Salt Lake City 
was negligent alleged by the defendant? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
4. If you answered Question No. 3 as "yes", answer 
this question. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence 
of Salt Lake City was either the sole proximate cause or a 
contributing proximate cause of the injuries of Julie Turner? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
2 
5. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, 
Julie Turner, was negligent as alleged by the defendants? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
6. If you answered Question No. 5 as "yesM, answer 
this question. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do 
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence 
of the plaintiff, Julie Turner, was either the sole proximate 
cause or a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
7. If you have answered either Question 4 or 6 or 
both of them as "Yes," then, and only then, answer the following 
question: Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to 
total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable 
to: 
A. Defendant, Amy Nelson % 
B. Salt Lake City % 
C. Plaintiff, Julie Turner % 
TOTAL 100% 
8. State the amount of special and general damages, 
if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the 
injuries complained of. 
3 
Medical Special Damages $_ 
General Damages $_ 
TOTAL $ 
DATED t h i s 5~& day of fti fr/Mbl , 1992. 
4 
EXHIBIT H 
EXCERPT FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS 
(R 324 - 326) 
(R 329) 
(R 331-332; 334) 
(R 358) 
(R 376) 
(R 397) 
(R 645) 
(R 735 - 747) 
(R 775) 
(R 792) 
t I it if it 
2 A M Y N E L S O N , having been duly summoned and sworn as 
3
 a witness on behalf of the Plaintiff, took the stand and testified 
4
 as follows: 
5
 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
6
 BY MR. HANSEN: 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q Will you please state your full name for the jury? 
A Amy Nelson. 
THE COURT: Ms. Nelson, you'll have to move up to 
the mike, if you will, please, and speak right into it so 
we can all hear you. Can you get up there? 
THE WITNESS: Kind of. 
THE COURT: That's better 
Q (By Mr. Hansen:) Ms. Nelson, what is your present 
address? 
A 4001 East Prospector Drive* 
Q Is that with your parents that you reside? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q So you're single; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q You recall this accident that occurred in July of 
1989; is that right? 
A Right. 
Q And am I correct that on that morning you had taken 
your fiance to the airport to go back to Minnesota or wherever 
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1
 he was from? 
2
 A That's correct. 
3
 Q What time was that that you took him to the airport? 
4
 A From what I remember, I believe it was about 7:30, 
5
 something like that. 
6
 Q Ycu recall what time this accident occurred? 
7
 A Around 8:30, 9. 
8
 Q And from 7:30 until the time of the accident, you 
9
 I were just driving around; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q I see. You indicated you were trying to kill some 
time until you had to be to work at ten o'clock; is that 
right? 
A That's right. 
Q Okay, and it's also correct, isn't it, that you'd 
never been on this road before? 
A That's correct. 
Q And the read we're referring to is Canyon Road? 
A Right. 
Q Is that your -- is that correct? 
A Right, that's correct. 
Q Okay, and do you remember having your deposition 
taken on July 2nd, 1991? 
A I do. 
Q Do you remember that? 
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1
 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
2
 Q At that time you indicated that ycu were thinking 
3
 I you'd go look at some homes behind the Capitol? is that 
right? 
A That's right. 
6
 Q Were you looking at homes at the time that this 
I accident occurred? 
A No. 
Q Now, you were proceeding in somewhat of a northbound 
direction on Canyon Road; is that right? 
A That's right. 
Q Did you observe the "Stop Ahead" sign as you were 
driving northbound on Canyon Road before reaching the 
intersection with Third Avenue? 
A I don't remember. 
Q You don't remember seeing it, do you? 
A No, I don't. 
Q And you didn't see the "Stop" sign, did you? 
A No, I didn't. 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, for clarification, I was not 
expecting we'd get to witnesses this morning. I was going 
to call Newell Knight as our first witness and admit this 
exhibit that he took a photograph of and I've shewn it to 
counsel. I think he's stipulated that he has no objection 
to that, provided that Mr. Knight testifies that that's a 
0326J 
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1 A No, not exactly. 
2 Q Is it your testimony that you -- that the "Stop" sign 
3 was partially obstructed*? 
4 A It is. 
5 Q How clear are you on that recollection? 
6 A Pretty clear. 
7
 Q At the time of your deposition you indicated that you 
8
 were somewhat vague about your recollection. 
9 | MR. STEVENS: Can you tell me what page you're 
referring to, counsel? 
MR. HANSEN: I was asking her a question specifically--) 
let's turn to page 34 of your deposition then. 
THE COURT: Better give her a copy of it, counsel. 
Q (By Mr. Hansen:) Let me first ask before I get to thi^ 
question, let me just ask, there was an investigating 
officer from Salt Lake City Police there at the scene of the 
17
 I accident; isn't that right? 
18
 I A That's right 
19
 » Q Were there more than one, do you recall? 
20
 I A I believe there were two. 
Q Okay, and isn't it true that you didn't tell either of 
those officers that there was any obstruction of the "Stop" 
23
 J sign? 
24
 I A That's true. 
Q Well, let me look -- let me have you look at page 34 
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8 
9 
10 
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A That's r i g h t . 
Q Now, you indicate you applied your brakes in full; 
is that right? 
A That's right. 
Q How quickly did you stop before the accident 
occurred? 
A Excuse me? 
Q What distance did you start applying your brakes 
before the accident occurred? 
A As soon as I saw the "Stop" sign. 
Q Pardon? 
A I must have been out in the intersection, I suppose. 
I don't know. 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, my hearing's not the best that 
it should be. I'm having a hard time hearing the witness. 
THE COURT: Speak right into the mike, please, and 
keep your 
I m Y 
If 
to 
THE 
brakes 
THE 
you111 
move up 
voice up. 
WITNESS: After I < 
and also when I saw 
COURT: I'm having 
speak right up into 
closer to the mike 
I might add. 
Q 
Go 
(By 
ahead, counsel. 
saw the 
Julie 
"Stop" sign, I put on 
Turner's car coming. 
a problem hearing you 
the mike. Maybe you'. 
. It's 
Mr. Hansen:) All right. 
not a very goo< 
You said after 
, too. 
LI have 
i mike. 
you saw 
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the "Step" sign? 
A After I saw the "Step" sign, 
Q And at what point did yeu see the "Step" sign? 
A When I was-- I don't know. 
Q So the "Step" sign wasn't obstructed then at seme 
pcit when yeu looked at it, 
7
 I A Well, that's right. 
8
 Q Okay, but I've got to get this straight because 
9
 I initially you indicated that yeu didn't see the "Step" sign. 
Then ycu testified ycu did see the "Step" sign, and then 
you're also saying it was partially obstructed. Which is it? 
A Well, them's a point that you could see it, but you 
couldn't see it until you come right up en it because --
I don't know, it's just -- I just -- that's all I can 
remember, I guess. 
Q You've also testified it was partial^obstructed. 
A Right. 
Q Was it three-quarters obstructed? Half obstructed? 
What did yeu observe? 
A Between three-fourths and half, I would think. 
Q So in other words, yeu could still see half of the 
"Stop" sign? 
A Between three-fourths and half. 
Q Okay, and you're not claiming that the "Stop ahead" 
sign was obstructed, are you? 
0332 
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1 I Q So you had gone into the Third Avenue intersection 
2 before you ever saw the plaintiff? 
3 A That's right. 
4 Q And I guess you just didn't have enough time to get 
5
 any estimates as to her speed; isn't that right? 
6 A That's right. 
7 MR. HANSEN: I think that's all the questions I have 
8
 right now, your Honor. 
9 J THE COURT: All right. You don't have any examination 
of this witness at this time, do you, Mr. Stevens? 
Well, I'm not asking if you want to take a break or 
not. We're going to break now, but I was simply inquiring 
if you're going to have any cross-examinationof your own 
14
 I witness. 
15
 I MR. STEVENS: I thought that I would, your Honor. 
16
 I However, I don't know how you've ruled on that as far as my 
ability to recall her. 
THE COURT: I haven't ruled on your ability to recall 
her. She's your witness. You can call her whenever you 
want to. 
MR. STEVENS: All right. I would like to ask her a 
couple of questions. 
THE COURT: Well, we'll recess at this point. You may 
24
 I do that after we come back. 
25
 • Members of the jury, we're going to recess until 1:30 
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1 MR. HANSEN: And your Honor, I guess last night as 
2 I was researching this, I came up with a case that hadn't 
3 been cited and I think it's directly on point with the 
4 Court's ruling, Davidson v. Prince, a 1991 Court of Appeals 
5 opinion that I wanted to make sure that I didn't misrepresent 
6 anything in our argument, and I think the Court's ruling is 
7 correctly reflective of the Davidson opinion and we will 
8 follow that. 
9 THE COURT: All right, Counsel. 
10 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, if I understand correctly 
11 then, and really, I don't have a problem with your Honor's 
12 ruling on this either. I heard experts in the past asked who 
13 was negligent or to compare the negligence or who was at 
14 fault. Those would not be permitted, and that was my 
15 concern. 
16 THE COURT: Okay, I won't allow that. The expert, 
17 however, assuming there's a proper foundation laid, may 
18 testify with regard to his opinion regarding the cause of the 
19 accident. 
20 MR. HANSEN: May I ask for one more clarification 
21 on that ruling? I guess my question is to specifically ask 
22 him what each driver may have done to contribute to the cause 
23 of the accident, is that appropriate? 
24 THE COURT: That's fair. 
25 All right, this issue on the motion for 
1 apportionment of fault on the part of Salt Lake City, a non-
2 party to this action, I've reviewed both of your memoranda 
3 regarding that issue and I am of the view, Counsel, that 
4 while, as I interpret it, there are no appellate decisions 
5 dealing with that issue in Utah — am I correct about that? 
6 I MR. STEVENS: I think that we've both cited 
7 nothing, your Honor* 
8 THE COURT: It's my view that the purpose of the 
9 No-Fault Act has to do with assuring that no party will be 
10 responsible to pay more than their appropriate share of the 
11 fault causing the accident, and given that overview, it seems 
12 to me that policy consideration behind the act, it seems to 
13 me that in these circumstances it's a fair request that Salt 
14 Lake City be considered on the apportionment portion of the 
15 verdict for purposes of assessing all of the fault that may 
16 have contributed to the cause of this accident, so your 
17 request, Mr. Stevens, to allow Salt Lake City to be named on 
18 the verdict form only as a contributor, potential contributor 
19 to the accident, is granted. 
20 MR. STEVENS: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All Tight, Counsel. If there's nothing 
22 further --
23 MR. STEVENS: There was one additional item, your 
24 Honor. I think we sent out a notice of hearing on it. That 
25 was regarding a late — 
1 Now, those are the facts as far as who's at fault* 
2 Our position is, and I think you'll find, that there was some 
3 obstruction of that stop sign and that to say this is just an 
4 ordinary running through a stop sign is not the case. I've 
5 had cases like that before, but here we have an eyewitness 
6 who was there, who checked. 
7 I think you'll also find that Julie Turner was 
8 probably going a little bit faster than she should have been, 
9 and the really sad part about it is if Julie Turner had 
10 gotten on her brakes just a little bit sooner or had been 
11 I traveling just a little bit slower, the cars never would have 
12 come together. 
13 Likewise, I'll have to admit, had Amy Nelson been 
14 able to see that stop sign 20 feet sooner and gotten on the 
15 brakes that much sooner, the cars would not have come 
16 together. You would not be here. I would not be here, the 
17 Judge wouldn't be here, but that's not what happened. I 
18 think the real fault here that — we're suggesting is with 
19 Salt Lake City. It's a bad design. They didn't have it well 
20 signed. 
21 Now, Plaintiff *ia$ talked about the injuries. 
22 After this accident occurred, Julie Turner had her step-
23 daughter with her in the cat. she was not hurt. Amy was not 
24 hurt. She, as a matter of fact, had forgotten to put on her 
25 I seat belt. She was thrown forward a little and bumped her 
037? 
1:24 
1 A Okay. 
2 Q Let me just ask you, Mr, Knight, in regards to 
3 accident reconstruction, is traffic sign obstruction some-
4 thing that reconstructionists deal with? 
5 A Oh, absolutely. That is part of reconstruction. 
6 If a sign is covered, if it isn't covered, how is it covered, 
7 why was it covered, what's the configuration of the streets 
8 — that's just typical of what you do. 
9 Q What about an investigating officer? Is that 
10 something that an investigating officer to an accident deals 
11 with? 
12 A Sure. 
13 Q And are they expected to report whether there's 
14 obstructions of traffic signs? 
15 A There's no question about it. In fact, on the 
16 accident report itself there's a section that you put down if 
17 you have obstructions. It's specifically requested if 
18 there's an obstruction, you put it down. 
19 Q What about with regards to this accident? 
20 A They should have put it down if there's an 
21 obstruction. 
22 Q What did they put down? 
23 A Well, they didn't ~ 
24 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, I object. 
25 THE COURT: Counsel, the exhibit hasn't been 
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1 A I did. 
2 Q But it's also true that you never told Officer Paul 
3 or any of the other investigating officers at the scene that 
4 you observed any obstruction of the stop sign; isn't that 
5 true? 
6 A That's correct. 
7 Q And isn't it true that the reason why you didn't 
8 tell any of the officers about the obstruction is you didn't 
9 think it was significant; isn't that what you testified to in 
10 your deposition? 
11 A That's correct, and I think I said that I was 
12 planning on taking care of it. 
13 Q But you didn't tell the police — 
14 A No. 
15 Q — anything about that, right? 
16 Now, you've said you didn't see the stop ahead 
17 sign. You weren't aware of the stop ahead sign at that time; 
18 isn't that right? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q And wasn't it your testimony in your deposition 
21 that the reason why you say you weren't aware if that stop 
22 ahead sign was there or not is because you didn't travel that 
23 road northbound. 
24 A Correct. 
25 Q Wasn't that your deposition testimony? 
re45 
11:131 
1 this patient. 
2 Q Do you feel any doubt about that opinion? 
3 A No question, no doubt. 
4 MR. STEVENS: That's all I have. Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hansen? 
6 1 MR. HANSEN: No cross-examination. 
7 THE COURT: All right, Doctor, you're free to go. 
8 Thank you. 
9 That concludes your evidence, does it not? 
10 MR. STEVENS: That does, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: The Defense rests? 
12 MR. STEVENS: We do. 
13 THE COURT: Members of the jury, I have a matter of 
14 law now to discuss with counsel outside your presence, so I 
15 will excuse you. We'll tell you when it's time to come back 
16 in. Remember the admonition I've given you. 
17 (Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.) 
18 THE COURT: The jury has exited the courtroom. 
19 Counsel, this is the time that I indicated I would 
20 hear from you with regard to the Plaintiff's filed motion to 
21 allow a newly discovered witness to be called as rebuttal or 
22 in the case in chief. You may proceed if you wish, 
23 Mr. Hansen. I've reviewed your motion and affidavit. 
24 MR. HANSEN: Yes, your Honor, and I think the basis 
25 for seeking to call this rebuttal witness was set forth in 
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1 the motion and my affidavit. Since the time that motion and 
2 affidavit has been filed, I think there's further strong 
3 evidence and reason for why this rebuttal witness is neces-
4 sary and critical to the Plaintiff's proper presentation of 
5 her case. Specifically, Mr. Guertz testified yesterday as a 
6 witness for the Defense and Mr. Guertz was identified as a 
7 witness on the Defendant's exhibit list which was timely 
8 filed, but also was after the time of discovery cutting off, 
9 so there was no opportunity for us to depose Mr. Guertz. We 
10 were aware that Mr. Guertz might testify that it was his 
11 impression that the — there was obstruction of the stop 
12 sign. We've never heard that Mr. Guertz was going to render 
13 testimony that the stop sign had been changed, may have been 
14 moved. Those are additional matters that aren't addressed in 
15 my written memoranda but I think are additional reasons why 
16 this witness is so critical to rebut the testimony that the 
17 Defendant has put on in the presentation of its case. 
18 I have provided some authority from cases outside 
19 of the state of Utah when I hurriedly put together my motion 
20 to allow this new witness. 
21 Additionally, last night I quickly tried to 
22 research the issue with regards to Utah law and I think the 
23 case that may be most helpful or as close as I was quickly 
24 able to find is State v. Albretsen and that is 782 P.2d 515. 
25 It's a Utah 1989 case before the Utah Supreme Court. In that 
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1 case the Supreme Court held that the trial court had acted 
2 within its discretion in allowing a rebuttal witness to 
3 testify and this was a criminal matter, even though the 
4 prosecuting attorney had not notified the defendant before 
5 trial that the witness would testify to contradict and 
6 impeach defendant's alibi testimony. It says that the 
7 evidence developed during the course of trial and that the 
8 prosecutor identified the possible rebuttal witness as soon 
9 as it was — in good faith, it says, as soon as the need 
10 became known, and I think we've complied with that in this 
11 case. 
12 As I saw the change in the posture of the case and 
13 especially with Mr. Guertzfs testimony and also Daniel 
14 Rusk's, we just believe it is very critical and we identified 
15 this new witness as soon as we were able to and I think we're 
16 entitled to put him on. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Hansen. 
18 Mr. Stevens, do you wish to respond? 
19 MR. STEVENS: I certainly do, your Honor. 
20 The Court ordered an exchange of witnesses on 
21 February 14th. There had already been interrogatories back 
22 and forth about who witnesses would be and some informal 
23 designation that Mr. Hansen and I had sent each letters or 
24 spoken on the phone about. We complied with that designa-
25 tion. Mr. Hansen didn't but filed the designation late. Our 
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1 designation went out February 14th. 
2 I believe Mr. Hansen was aware — if we1re talking 
3 now that Mr. Guertz is a surprise, and that's a new argument 
4 to me, he was aware of Mr. Guertzfs involvement before that, 
5 I believe, but certainly by February 14th. There was abso-
6 lutely no effort to seek any deposition of Mr. Guertz or ask 
7 what he might have to say. We spoke on the phone. He told 
8 me what he thought Mr. Knight was going to say and I gave him 
9 an outline generally of what Mr. Guertz was going to say, but 
10 no effort to depose him, no effort at all to find out what 
11 was up with him. 
12 Now, Mr. Guertz testified, I'll agree, that the 
13 sign post had been replaced. That would be his opinion. 
14 That opinion, as I see it, goes only to the validity of the 
15 photographs that have come in, not to anything else, and 
16 we've all agreed that the photographs that came in don't 
17 necessarily represent the scene at the time anyway, so I 
18 don't see how there's any surprise there, nor did Mr. Guertz 
19 even offer the opinion that it had been moved, just that it 
20 could have been. 
21 I think we get beck to the basic issue in this case 
22 which is, was the sign obstructed or not, and Mr. Hansen 
23 claims there's some big surprise and prejudice to him because 
24 Salt Lake City's going to be on the verdict. Well, your 
25 Honor, that just isn't true, and the fact is this case was 
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1 filed back in March '91. In April we raised the issue of 
2 third-party fault* In May we sent interrogatory answers 
3 saying the tree obstructed the stop sign. In July 
4 Plaintiff's deposition was taken and we went over and over 
5 the tree in front of the stop sign. 
6 We had anticipated calling Mr. Rusk all along. 
7 Mr. Hansen didn't set his deposition to find out what he had 
8 to say. I don't know if he contacted him, but I set his 
9 deposition and we took his deposition in January. At that 
10 time Mr. Rusk testified as he did in court that the tree 
11 obstructed the stop sign. Mr. Hansen has known from at least 
12 May of last year that the obstruction of that stop sign was 
13 an issue. If he needed to go out and get a witness and find 
14 somebody, he had ample time to do so. It was reinforced in 
15 July. It was further reinforced in January. 
16 It appears to me that what happened was on the day 
17 of trial, the night of the first day of trial, they make an 
18 effort to go find somebody and they've dug someone up. I 
19 haven't seen the person. I don't know who he is. I've had 
20 no opportunity to depose him. I've had no opportunity to 
21 find out at all what this person plans on testifying to. I 
22 don't know if he's — what his basis would be to testify, and 
23 to say that now you can come in at this date and essentially 
24 run rampant through everybody's trial prep, the whole theory 
25 of the case that we presented in our opening statement and 
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1 say we have to bring in this new witness because of surprise, 
2 I think is absolutely ridiculous. 
3 if the argument Mr. Hansen makes is, well, you 
4 added Salt Lake City on the verdict so that justifies this, 
5 that makes no sense, your Honor. Up until Salt Lake City was 
6 added to the verdict, he knew that the position we were 
7 taking was that Salt Lake City was 100 percent responsible 
8 and he was going to have to anticipate contesting with that 
9 issue, that Salt Lake City was at fault and Amy was not. He 
10 needed evidence on that and he knew he needed evidence on 
11 that. 
12 The fact that now we have a situation where we're 
13 saying, well, maybe Salt Lake City's only 90 percent instead 
14 of a hundred percent, that doesn't change the investigation 
15 he needs to make. That doesn't change the issues in front of 
16 the jury as far as was it obstructed or wasn't it obstructed. 
17 That issue has been here for months, almost a year, and to 
18 come in now and say well, we ran around after trial ended and 
19 we came up with a guy with no explanation as to why they 
20 couldn't have found such a person months ago, I think, does 
21 not meet any sort of standard. 
22 Now, the case that he's just cited, this criminal 
23 case, State v. Albretsen, refers to allowing a witness in 
24 when there's some surprise in the trial, when it's because of 
25 some new evidentiary matter that comes up. Well, if we had 
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1 surprise him, if we hadn't said we're claiming the stop 
2 sign's blocked and if we walked in the first day of trial and 
3 Amy for the first time said, "Well, I think there were trees 
4 in front of it," then he'd have a position and then he'd be 
5 able to say surprise, "I've got to get something and you've 
6 got to let me get a witness because my trial prep has been 
7 disorganized because of you, defendant's, actions," but 
8 that's not the case we've got here. 
9 The case is that we have both known of this issue 
10 for a long, long time and it's not proper to go get somebody 
11 at the last minute. I think if the Court — even the cases 
12 that he's cited where he put in the cite from A.L.R.4th, even 
13 those cases refer to a test of whether the need could have 
14 reasonably been anticipated, and in this case, it could have 
15 been, and in cases that do allow this kind of surprise 
16 witness, seems to me to say you've got to have a continuance 
17 then and we've got to go out and have an opportunity to 
18 depose this new person, if there is some justification for 
19 letting him in. I think a continuance is not what either 
20 side wants. It's not fair to us and I think to shove a new 
21 witness on us now is not fair to us. 
22 I'd cite the Court — the quick research that I was 
23 able to get done this morning — to 63 A.L.R.4th, section 16. 
24 It's the same A.L.R. cite. There is a listing of cases 
25 upholding a denial or reversing the allowance of such a 
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1 witness when it has a prejudicial effect on the trial prepa-
2 ration and strategy of the other party, and that's exactly 
3 what we've got here. 
4 We built our case, we put it together, we got 
5 witnesses. They apparently didn't. I don't know why not, 
6 but it's certainly not our fault and we shouldn't bear the 
7 burden of it. 
8 Thank you, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Stevens. 
10 MR. HANSEN: May I respond? 
11 THE COURT: Yes, you may, Mr. Hansen. 
12 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, when Mr. Stevens says that 
13 a year ago this was a big issue and it was well known, I 
14 would go back to asking why was it that Mr. Stevens waited 
15 until six days before trial to file his motion to add Salt 
16 Lake City to the special jury verdict? 
17 As I previously argued, I think the statute indi-
18 cates that they shouldn't bring them in for purposes of the 
19 apportionment of fault. That was not done, but six days 
20 before trial, he made his motion, and on the morning of 
21 trial, the Court in an effort to be fair, stating that the 
22 Court felt that the statutory scheme is to avoid any party 
23 being responsible for more than its proportionate share, 
24 allowed that to occur. I submit that that was in an attempt 
25 of fairness to the parties. I don't believe it was timely 
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1 done by Mr. Stevens. 
2 Now he's turning the tables and trying to say that 
3 because his approach, that he's granted on the morning of 
4 trial, the opportunity to point to Salt Lake City as some 
5 defendant who isn't even here in essence, and he wants to 
6 argue now that we shouldn't be able to try to respond to that 
7 change of circumstances, I think is unfair prejudice to my 
8 client. 
9 I'd also submit that rebuttal testimony doesn't 
10 have to be based on surprise. 
11 There's also the Utah case of Board of Education of 
12 South Sanpete v. Barton which is at 617 P.2d 347. I do have 
13 a copy, your Honor. In that case the Court talks about 
14 rebuttal witnesses. It says, "Rebuttal evidence is that 
15 which tends to refute or to so modify or explain as to 
16 nullify or minimize the effect of the opponent's evidence." 
17 Now, I submit that there is considerable evidence 
18 that the Defendant has presented in their case that I think 
19 we're entitled to present rebuttal testimony and some of it 
20 is surprise. Mr. Guertz's testimony that because there was 
21 some statement that the sitjn may have been bent, that he now 
22 says that he thinks that sign was replaced, that is new and 
23 that is surprising and we have a witness who's prepared to 
24 rebut most of the — most, if not all, of the points of the 
25 Defendant with regards to the obstruction of the stop sign, 
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1 with regards to whether it was in a bent and improper con-
2 dition, and we submit that it is critical that we be allowed 
3 to call this witness in the interest of fairness and accord-
4 ing to the rules. 
5 THE COURT: Counsel, I am persuaded that the motion 
6 to call the new witness should be and is denied, and my 
7 reasoning is as has been stated by Mr. Stevens, but moreover, 
8 it has been the essential defense here that the sign was 
9 obstructed, thereby limiting the Defendant's opportunity to 
10 timely observe it and take appropriate action. That aspect 
11 of the Guertz testimony is not new, and my decision to allow 
12 Salt Lake City on the verdict form for purposes of apportion-
13 ment of the responsibility here really does not change the 
14 essential defense that the sign was obstructed. The claim 
15 here has been made that that was a fact and evidence has been 
16 adduced, if it's believable to the jury, that that was the 
17 fact, and now at this point, this late date, it seems to me 
18 that it puts the Plaintiff at an unfair disadvantage, not 
19 knowing who this individual is and having had the opportunity 
20 to cross-examine or at least depose this witness, while as 
21 Mr. Guertz was available ajxd notified in a timely fashion as 
22 far as the opposition was concerned, that he would be testi-
23 fying. I am therefore persuaded that it would place the 
24 Plaintiff in an unfair posture to grant this motion and it's 
25 denied. 
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1 MR* HANSEN: You mean the Defendant? 
2 THE COURT: Excuse me, the Defendant's position is 
3 sustained. Your motion is denied. 
4 Let's now repair to chambers and work on 
5 Instructions. 
6 1 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, if I may, I would move fo 
7 a continuance and request that Defendant be given the oppor-
8 tunity to depose this rebuttal witness. I think this testi-
9 mony is critical. I believe it is essential that we be able 
10 to allow this rebuttal testimony and if the Court's position 
11 is that there's unfair timing on this, then we would will-
12 ingly agree and would move for a continuance of the trial to 
13 allow sufficient time for Mr. Stevens to take this deposi-
14 tion, which my direct testimony on him is not going to be any 
15 more than 20 minutes, so 10 to 20 minutes, so I don't think 
16 it would be a long deposition. I think we could take it over 
17 the noon hour or whenever the Court would desire, but I'd 
18 move for a continuance, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: No. For the reasons stated, Counsel, 
20 your request for a continuance is denied. 
21 We will now rece-ss and work on our Instructions. 
22 MR. HANSEN: One more — may I proffer the 
23 evidence? We have the witness here. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I think his proposed evidence is 
25 basically set forth in your motion and your affidavit. He 
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will testify the sign wasn't obstructed. 
MR. HANSEN: And in talking with him, he would give 
more detail than what I provided in the affidavit. I would 
like to proffer a Mr. Jim Nakling — and I found his name is 
spelled N-a-k-1-i-n-g, and he resides at 122 North Canyon 
Road, one house away from the stop sign, and his testimony is 
that for the past 10 years he has walked his dogs past that 
stop sign two times per day on a usual day and he has never 
seen any obstruction of that stop sign. The tree to which it 
is alleged obstructed the stop sign has never been cut. The 
tree in front of his house has never been cut in the past 10 
years that he's been there and furthermore, the stop sign has 
never been changed and he's never observed it bent during the 
past seven or eight years. 
He will further testify that the stop ahead sign 
which is somewhat in dispute as to when it was placed there, 
he will testify that that stop ahead sign has been there, as 
has the stop sign, since the road was repaired after the 
floods of 1983, so this is all of the testimony that I think 
is essential that this witness would testify about. 
THE COURT: Wellf, and that's fine. It seems to me 
that insofar as the dispute about the condition of the 
visibility of the sign is concerned, we do have conflicting 
evidence on both sides, that Mr. Nakling's testimony would be 
duplicative of that, and that's what I perceive to be the 
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1 principle issue here and not whether or not the sign was bent 
2 or removed, so my ruling will stand, Counsel. 
3 Let's now recess. 
4 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
5 THE COURT: The jury, parties and counsel are 
6 present. 
7 Instructions to the jury. 
8 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, one preliminary matter 
9 your clerk called to my attention. There are a couple of 
10 exhibits that she didn't have a formal ruling on. I think it 
11 was 42 and — 
12 THE CLERK: Twenty-five through 39. 
13 MR. STEVENS: I think we both agreed that those 
14 would come in. 
15 THE COURT: That's correct. 
16 MR. HANSEN: That's correct. 
17 THE COURT: Very well, those exhibits will be 
18 received. 
19 MR. STEVENS: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
21 (Whereupon, Judgp Frederick read aloud Instructions 
22 to the jury.) 
23 THE COURT: Counsel, you may present your closing 
24 arguments. 
25 How much time do you anticipate, Mr. Hansen? 
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1 going any speed, and she would have stopped and there would 
2 have been no accident. That's my point. I'm not inconsist-
3 ent, I don't think. 
4 Now, Mr. Hansen makes a big issue of the fact that 
5 Mr. Guertz says he can't say speed was a factor, but the fact 
6 is all Mr. Guertz can analyze is the crush of the autos which 
7 he came out at five miles per hour each on, and Mr. Knight 
8 essentially agrees and he doesn't have information on speed, 
9 if she was going 60 and slowed down and got going to five 
10 miles per hour. All he knows is that's what she was doing at 
11 the time. He said, "Well, gee, there weren't any skid marks 
12 noted on the police report," but keep in mind, ladies and 
13 gentlemen, that both of these people told the cops, "I'm not 
14 hurt," and this was not a big accident. This was not an 
15 involved accident investigation. It was a minor intersection 
16 accident, so when we look at Plaintiff's own testimony, it 
17 appears there's some fault there. 
18 The prime fault, as Mr. Hansen mentions, and I 
19 agree, is Salt Lake City. The prime fault for the sign. The 
20 instruction you've got in the package the Judge will give you 
21 says they have to maintain, the sign and the evidence is 
22 undisputed they didn't. It was covered. It was blocked. 
23 That's what the prime fault of this accident is, and I 
24 understand that Julie Turner didn't realize that and for 
25 years she's been angry at Amy Nelson and assumed that she 
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the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in 
favor of the issue presented, answer yes. if you find the 
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a 
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the 
evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer 
no. Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
Number one, considering all of the evidence in this 
case, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the Defendant, Amy Nelson, was negligent as alleged by the 
Plaintiff? Answer, no. Dated this 5th day of March, 1992, 
signed by the foreperson. 
THE COURT: Counsel, do you wish to have the jury 
polled, Mr. Hansen? 
MR. HANSEN: Yes, we do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, I'll ask you one 
question, to which you will answer either yes or no, and that 
question is, was this and is this your verdict, Mr. Little? 
MR. LITTLE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Ms. Adams? 
MS. ADAMS: Yes., 
THE COURT: Ms. Hill? 
MS. HILL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Watson? 
MR. WATSON: Yes. 
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